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Abstract
In this paper we first give an elementary proof of existence of
equilibrium with dividends in an economy with possibly satiated con-
sumers. We then introduce a no-arbitrage condition and show that it
is equivalent to the existence of equilibrium with dividends.
Journal of economic literature classification numbers: C62, D50.
1 Introduction
In the Arrow-Debreu model (1954), the authors impose a nonsatiation as-
sumption which states that for every consumer,whatever the commodity bun-
dle may be, there exists another consumption bundle she/he strictly prefers.
It is well-known, that in presence of satiation, a Walras equilibrium may not
exist since for every price, there could be a consumer who maximizes her/his
preference in the interior of her/his budget set. In presence of financial assets,
satiation is rather a rule than an exception. Both the mean-variance CAPM
and the expected-utility model with negative returns exhibit satiation (see
e.g. Nielsen (1989), Dana, Le Van and Magnien (1997), Section 5).
∗The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for her/his observations, criticisms
and suggestions
†Corresponding author, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, University Paris 1
Pantheon-Sorbonne, CNRS, levan@univ-paris1.fr
‡Hanoi University of Commerce, baminhdhtm@hotmail.com
1
The absence of the nonsatiation condition with fixed prices was studied by
Dre`ze and Muller (1980) by introducing the notion of coupons equilibrium,
Aumann and Dre`ze (1986) with the concept of dividends, Mas-Colell (1992)
who used the term of slack equilibrium. In Debreu (1959, Theory of Value),
the notion of an equilibrium relative to the price system can be viewed as
an equilibrium with possibly negative dividends. We can cite other authors
who worked on nonsatiation: e.g. Makarov (1981), Kajii (1996), Florig and
Yildiz (2002),Konovalov (2005), and for a continuum of consumers, Cornet,
Topuzu and Yildiz (2003).
In this paper we first give an easy proof of existence of equilibria with
dividends. For Aumann and Dre`ze, a dividend is a ”cash allowance added
to the budget by each trader. Its function is to distribute among the non-
satiated agents the surplus created by the failure of the satiated agents to
use their entire budget”. Here, we introduce an additional good (e.g. fi-
nancial asset, or paper money) that the satiated agents will want to have
in order to fill up their budget sets. For that, they will buy this additional
good from the nonsatiated agents. More precisely, we will introduce an in-
termediary economy by adding another good that any agent would like to
have if she/he meets satiation. In this economy, the nonsatiation condition
is satisfied. There thus exists a Walras equilibrium. We show that this equi-
librium actually corresponds to an equilibrium with dividends for the initial
economy. It is interesting to notice that we show that, at this equilibrium,
the satiated agents will buy the additional good from the nonsatiated agents
and if an agent is not satiated then the value of the additional good will be
zero for that agent. It is important to note that the idea to introduce an
additional good is not new when one considers the equilibrium with paper
money of Kajii (1996). What is new in this paper is the mechanism of ex-
change: it is defined clearly with well-defined partial extended preferences
that the satiated consumers who meet satiation points will buy additional
good from the consumers who do not meet satiation.
Second, we allow our model to have financial assets. If we assume that the
production sets satisfy in particular the inaction and irreversibility conditions
(see Debreu, 1959) and the utility functions satisfy the No-Half Line Condi-
tion (see e.g. Werner, 1986, Page and Wooders 1996, Dana, Le Van and Mag-
nien, 1999, Allouch, Le Van, Page, 2002), then there exists an equilibrium
with dividends iff there exists a no-arbitrage price. Usually, no-arbitrage con-
ditions are introduced in an exchange economy with financial markets. Here,
we introduce a no-arbitrage condition in an economy with production. We
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think of two-period models where firms produce consumption goods using
capital goods and the consumers buy, in the first period, consumption goods
and assets. An opportunity of arbitrage is a system of prices of commodi-
ties (consumption goods or assets) for which, either at least one consumer,
without cost, can increase without bound her/his consumption, or one firm
produces more and more because her/his profit increases without bound.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section
2. The main result is given in Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce the no-
arbitrage price condition and prove that existence of equilibrium is equivalent
to existence of no-arbitrage prices. In Section 5, Appendix 1 gives a proof
of Theorem 2 of Section 3. In Section 6, Appendix 2 presents an example of
economies with production where the no-arbitrage condition is satisfied.
2 The Model
We consider an economy having l goods, J producers, and I consumers. We
suppose that the numbers of the producers and the consumers are finite. For
each i ∈ I, letXi ⊂ Rl denote the set of consumption goods, let ui : Xi −→ R
denote the utility and let ei ∈ Rl be the initial endowment. Furthermore for
each j ∈ J , let Yj ⊂ Rl denote the producing set of the producer j.
Let θij be the ratio of the profit that consumer i can get from the producer
j. We suppose that 0 ≤ θij ≤ 1,
∑
i∈I θij = 1. Let p ∈ Rl denote the price of
the goods.
In the sequel we will denote this economy by
E = {(Xi, ui, ei)i∈I , (Yj)j∈J , (θij)i∈I,j∈J} .
2.1 Preliminaries
We recall that a function ui is said to be quasiconcave if its level-set
Lα = {xi ∈ Xi : ui(xi) ≥ α}
is convex for each α ∈ R.
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The function ui is strictly quasiconcave if and only if xi, x
′
i ∈ Xi, ui(x′i) >
ui(xi) and λ ∈ [0, 1), then
ui(λxi + (1− λ)x′i) > ui(xi).
It means that
ui(λxi + (1− λ)x′i) > min(ui(xi), ui(x′i)).
The function ui is upper semicontinuous if and only if L
α is closed for
each α.
Let Si denote the set of satiation points of ui. Then
Si = {x′i ∈ Xi : ui(x′i) ≥ ui(xi), for any xi ∈ Xi}.
By this definition, the function ui has no satiation point if for all xi ∈ Xi
there exists x′i ∈ Xi such that ui(x′i) > ui(xi). It is easy to check that Si is
convex and closed.
2.2 Definition 1
A Walras equilibrium of E is a list ((x∗i )i∈I , (y∗j )j∈J , p∗) ∈ (Rl)|I| × (Rl)|J | ×
(Rl {0}) which satisfies
(a)
∑
i∈I x
∗
i =
∑
i∈I ei +
∑
j∈J y
∗
j ( Market clearing);
(b) for each i one has
p∗.x∗i = p
∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij. sup p
∗.Yj
(butget constraint), and for each xi ∈ Xi,with ui(xi) > ui(x∗i ), it holds
p∗.xi > p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij. sup p
∗.Yj.
(c) For each j ∈ J, y∗j ∈ Yj and p∗.y∗j = sup p∗.Yj, where sup p.Yj = supyj∈Yj p.yj.
A Walras quasi-equilibrium is a list ((x∗i )i∈I , (y
∗
j )j∈J , p
∗) ∈ (Rl)|I| × (Rl)|J | ×
(Rl {0}) which satisfies (a), (c), and (b) with the following change:
ui(xi) > ui(x
∗
i )⇒ p∗.xi ≥ p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij. sup p
∗.Yj.
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2.3 Definition 2
An equilibrium with dividends (d∗i )i∈I ∈ R|I|+ of E is a list ((x∗i )i∈I , (y∗j )j∈J , p∗) ∈
(Rl)|I| × (Rl)|J | × Rl which satisfies:
(a)
∑
i∈I x
∗
i =
∑
i∈I ei +
∑
j∈J y
∗
j ( Market clearing);
(b) for each i one has
p∗.x∗i ≤ p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij. sup p
∗.Yj + d∗i
(butget constraint), and for each xi ∈ Xi,with ui(xi) > ui(x∗i ), it holds
p∗.xi > p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij. sup p
∗.Yj + d∗i
(c) For each j ∈ J, y∗j ∈ Yj and p∗.y∗j = sup p∗.Yj, where sup p.Yj = supyj∈Yj p.yj.
2.4 Definition 3
A feasible allocation is the list ((xi)i∈I , (yj)j∈J) ∈
∏
i∈I Xi ×
∏
j∈J Yj which
satisfies
∑
i∈I xi =
∑
i∈I ei +
∑
j∈J yj. We denote by A the set of feasible
allocations and by Ai the projection of A on the i
th component.
The main purpose of this paper is to give an easy proof of existence
of equilibrium with dividends of economy E when satiation points occur in
the preferences of the consumers. Our idea is to introduce an intermediary
economy with an additional good (think of financial asset or money paper)
that the consumers want to possess when they meet satiation. In this new
economy, there is no satiation point. Hence, an equilibrium exists under
appropriate assumptions. We show that this equilibrium is an equilibrium
with dividends for the initial economy. It is worth to point out that at this
equilibrium point, the consumers who meet satiation points will buy the
additional good from the consumers who do not meet satiation.
2.5 The Assumptions
We now list our assumptions.
(H1) For each i ∈ I, the set Xi is nonempty closed convex;
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(H2) For each i ∈ I, the function ui is strictly quasiconcave and upper
semicontinuous;
(H3) For each j ∈ J , the set Yj is nonempty closed convex and Y =
∑
j∈J Yj
is closed.
(H4) The feasible set A is compact.
(H5) For every i, ei ∈ int(Xi−
∑
j∈J θijYj).Moreover, for every i ∈ I, xi ∈ Ai
the set {x′i : ui(x′i) > ui(xi)} is relatively open in Xi.
Remark 1 (1) Assumptions (H1), (H2) are standard.
(2) Assumption (H3) can be relaxed as follows: for each j ∈ J , the set Yj is
nonempty and the total production set Y =
∑
j Yj is closed and convex (see
Remark 5 (1) below).
(3) Assumption (H4) is satisfied when the consumption sets are the positive
orthant Rl+, the production sets satisfy 0 ∈ Yj,∀j, the total production set
satisfies Y ∩ (−Y ) = {0} (irreversibility) and Y ∩ Rl+ = {0} (one cannot
produce without using input). It is also satisfied in a financial exchange
economy with strictly concave utility functions and a no-arbitrage condition
(see e.g. Page (1987) or Page and Wooders (1996)). We give in Appendix 2
two examples of economies with production and assets where the no-arbitrage
condition is satisfied.
(4) Assumption (H5) ensures that any quasi-equilibrium is actually an equi-
librium.
3 The Results
We first give an existence of Walras equilibrium theorem when there exists
no satiation.
Theorem 2 Assume (H1)− (H4) and
(i)
∀i, ei ∈ (Xi −
∑
j∈J
θijYj)
∀i,∀xi ∈ Xi,∃x′i ∈ Xi such that ui(x′i) > ui(xi).
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then there exists a quasi-equilibrium.
(ii) If we add H5 and
∀i,∀xi ∈ Xi,∃x′i ∈ Xi such that ui(x′i) > ui(xi),
then there exists an equilibrium.
Proof. We adapt the proof given in Dana, Le Van and Magnien (1999) for
an exchange exconomy. A detailed proof is given in Appendix 1.
We now come to our main result which is a corollary of the previous
theorem.
Theorem 3 Assume (H1)−(H5). Then there exists an equilibrium with div-
idends.
Proof. Let us introduce the intermediary economy
Ê =
{
(X̂i, ûi, êi)i∈I , (Ŷj)j∈J , (θij)i∈I,j∈J
}
where: Xˆi = Xi×R+, eˆi = (ei, δi) with δi > 0 for any i ∈ I and Yˆj = (Yj, 0)
for any j ∈ J, and the utilities ûi are defined as follows (recall that Si is the
set of satiation points for agent i): let µ > 0, Mi = max {ui(x) : x ∈ Xi} .
- If xi /∈ Si, then ûi(xi, di) = ui(xi) for any di ≥ 0.
- If xi ∈ Si, then ûi(xi, di) = ui(xi) + µdi = Mi + µdi for any di ≥ 0.
We will check that Assumption (H2) is satisfied for every ûi.
To prove that ûi is quasi-concave and upper semi-continuous, it suffices to
prove that the set Lˆαi = {(xi, di) ∈ Xi × R+ : uˆi(xi, di) ≥ α} is closed and
convex for every α. We have two cases:
Case 1: α < Mi. We claim that Lˆ
α
i = L
α
i ×R+. Indeed, let (xi, di) ∈ Lˆαi . It
follows uˆi(xi, di) ≥ α and there are two possibilities for xi:
+ If xi /∈ Si, then uˆi(xi, di) = ui(xi). It implies ui(xi) ≥ α or xi ∈ Lαi and
hence (xi, di) ∈ Lαi × R+.
+ If xi ∈ Si, then ui(xi) = Mi > α. This follows xi ∈ Lαi and (xi, di) ∈
Lαi × R+.
So, Lˆαi ⊂ Lαi × R+. It is obvious Lαi × R+ ⊂ Lˆαi .
Case 2: α ≥ Mi. We claim that Lˆαi = Si ×
{
di : di ≥ α−Miµ
}
. Indeed, if
uˆi(xi, di) ≥ α, then xi ∈ Si. In this case, ûi(xi, di) = Mi+µdi ≥ α, and hence
di ≥ α−Miµ . The converse is obvious.
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It is also obvious that Si is closed and convex. We have proved that ûi is
upper semicontinuous and quasi-concave for every i.
We now prove that ûi is strictly quasi-concave.
Indeed, take Mi = ui(x) with x ∈ Si and (xi, di), (x′i, d′i) ∈ Xi×R+ such that
uˆi(x
′
i, d
′
i) > uˆi(xi, di). For any λ ∈ ]0, 1[, we verify that
uˆi(λxi + (1− λ)x′i, λdi + (1− λ)d′i) > uˆi(xi, di).
Since uˆi(x
′
i, d
′
i) > uˆi(xi, di) , we can consider the following cases:
Case 1: x′i ∈ Si, xi ∈ Si. We have
uˆi(xi, di) = Mi + µdi, uˆi(x
′
i, d
′
i) = Mi + µd
′
i.
It follows that d′i > di. Hence
λdi + (1− λ)d′i > λdi + (1− λ)di = di.
Since λxi + (1− λ)x′i ∈ Si, we deduce
uˆi(λxi + (1− λ)x′i, λdi + (1− λ)d′i) =
Mi + µ(λdi + (1− λ)d′i) > Mi + µdi = uˆi(xi, di).
Case 2: x′i ∈ Si, xi /∈ Si. It implies ui(x′i) > ui(xi). Since ui is a strictly
quasi-concave function, we obtain
ui(λxi + (1− λ)x′i) > ui(xi).
2a: If λxi + (1− λ)x′i ∈ Si, then
uˆi(λxi+(1−λ)x′i, λdi+(1−λ)d′i) = Mi+µ(λdi+(1−λ)d′i) > ui(xi) = uˆi(xi, di).
2b:If λxi + (1− λ)x′i /∈ Si, then
uˆi(λxi+(1−λ)x′i, λdi+(1−λ)d′i) = ui(λxi+(1−λ)x′i) > ui(xi) = uˆi(xi, di).
Case 3 x′i /∈ Si, xi /∈ Si. We have
uˆi(xi, di) = ui(xi), uˆi(x
′
i, d
′
i) = ui(x
′
i).
This follows ui(x
′
i) > ui(xi). Similarly as above we consider
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3a: If λxi + (1− λ)x′i ∈ Si, then
uˆi(λxi + (1− λ)x′i, λdi + (1− λ)d′i) = Mi + µ(λdi + (1− λ)d′i)
> ui(xi) = uˆi(xi, di).
3b:If λxi + (1− λ)x′i /∈ Si, then
uˆi(λxi+(1−λ)x′i, λdi+(1−λ)d′i) = ui(λxi+(1−λ)x′i) > ui(xi) = uˆi(xi, di).
We have proved that the function uˆi is strictly quasi-concave.
It remains to prove that the uˆi has no satiation point.
Indeed, let (xi, di) ∈ Xi × R+. We consider the following cases
Case 1: xi /∈ Si. Take x′i ∈ Xi such that ui(x′i) > ui(xi) and d′i = di.We
have uˆi(x
′
i, di) ≥ ui(x′i) > ui(xi) = uˆi(xi, di).
Case 2: xi ∈ Si. Take x′i = xi and d′i > di. We have
uˆi(x
′
i, d
′
i) = uˆi(x
′
i) + µd
′
i > ui(xi) + µdi = uˆi(xi, di).
We have proved that the uˆi has no satiation point.
Let us consider the feasible set Â of Ê . We have:
Â = {((xi, di)i∈I , (yj, 0)j∈J) : ∀i, xi ∈ Xi, di ∈ R+,∀j, yj ∈ Yj and∑
i∈I
xi =
∑
i∈I
ei +
∑
j∈J
yj,
∑
i∈I
di =
∑
i∈I
δi.}
It is obvious that Â is compact.
It is also obvious that Assumptions (H1), (H2), (H3) are fulfilled in economy
Ê .
Apply Theorem 2, part (i).
There exists a quasi-equilibrium
(
(x∗i , d
∗
i )i∈I , (y
∗
j , 0)j∈J , (p
∗, q∗)
)
with (p∗, q∗) 6=
(0, 0). It satisfies:
(i)
∑
i∈I
(x∗i , d
∗
i ) =
∑
i∈I
(ei, δi) +
∑
j∈J
(y∗j , 0),
(ii) for any i ∈ I, p∗.x∗i + q∗d∗i = p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij sup(p
∗ · Yj + q∗ × 0) + q∗δi,
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and
(iii) for any j ∈ J, p∗ · y∗j = sup(p∗ · Yj).
Observe that since µ > 0, the price q∗ must be nonnegative.
We claim that
(
(x∗i )i∈I , (y
∗
j )j∈J , p
∗)
)
is an equilibrium with dividends (q∗δi)i∈I .
Indeed, first, we have
∀i ∈ I, p∗.x∗i ≤ p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θijp
∗ · y∗j + q∗δi.
Now, let xi ∈ Xi, ui(xi) > ui(x∗i ). That implies x∗i /∈ Si and hence uˆi(x∗i , d∗i ) =
ui(x
∗
i ). We also have uˆi(xi, 0) = ui(xi). That means uˆ(xi, 0) > uˆi(x
∗
i , d
∗
i ).
This implies
p∗.xi = p∗.xi + q∗ × 0 ≥ p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij sup p
∗.Yj + (q∗δi).
We claim that
p∗.xi > p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij sup p
∗.Yj + (q∗δi).
Assume the contrary, i.e.
p∗.xi = p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij sup p
∗.Yj + (q∗δi). (1)
Then, since
ei ∈ int(Xi −
∑
j∈J
θijYj),
we have
inf p∗.(Xi −
∑
j∈J
θijYj) < p
∗.ei.
This means that there exists x′i ∈ Xi, y′j ∈ Yj such that
p∗.(x′i −
∑
j∈J
θijy
′
j) < p
∗.ei
which implies
p∗.x′i <
∑
j∈J
θijp
∗.y′j + p
∗.ei ≤
∑
j∈J
θijp
∗.y∗j + p
∗ei + q∗δi. (2)
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Let xλi = λx
′
i + (1 − λ)xi with λ > 0. Since {xi : ui(xi) > ui(x∗i )}, by
assumption, is relatively open, we have
ui(x
λ
i ) > ui(x
∗
i ). (3)
for every λ sufficiently small. On the other hand, from (1) and (2) we have
p∗.(λx′i + (1− λ)xi) = λp∗.x′i + (1− λ)p∗.xi
< λ(
∑
j∈J
θijp
∗.y∗j + p
∗.ei + q∗δi) + (1− λ)(
∑
j∈J
θijp
∗.y∗j + p
∗.ei + q∗δi)
or
p∗.xλi + q
∗ × 0 < p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θijp
∗.y∗j + q
∗δi. (4)
Since uˆi(x
λ
i , 0) = ui(x
λ
i ) and uˆi(x
∗
i , d
∗
i ) = ui(x
∗
i ), relations (3) and (4) contra-
dict the fact that
(
(x∗i , d
∗
i )i∈I , (y
∗
j , 0)j∈J , (p
∗, q∗)
)
is a quasi-equilibrium of the
intermediary economy.
Corollary 4 Assume (H1)−(H4). Let ((x∗i )i∈I , (y∗j )j∈J , p∗) be an equilibrium
with dividends (d∗i ). If consumer i is non-satiated, then
p∗.x∗i = p
∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij. sup p
∗.Yj + q∗δi,
and p∗ 6= 0.
Suppose that every consumer is non-satiated. Then an equilibrium with div-
idends will be reduced to a Walras equilibrium. That is the dividend is zero
and the equilibrium price is non-zero.
Proof. First, we prove that, if x∗i is not a satiation point, then q
∗d∗i = 0.
Indeed, let ui(xi) = uˆi(xi, 0) > ui(x
∗
i ) = uˆi(x
∗
i , d
∗
i ). We then have
p∗.xi ≥ p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij sup p
∗.Yj + q∗δi = p∗.x∗i + q
∗d∗i .
For any λ ∈ ]0, 1[ , from the strict quasi-concavity of ui, we have ui(λxi +
(1 − λ)x∗i ) > ui(x∗i ) and hence p∗.(λxi + (1 − λ)x∗i ) ≥ p∗.x∗i + q∗d∗i . Letting
λ converge to zero, we obtain q∗d∗i ≤ 0. Thus q∗d∗i = 0. That means that
a consumer who does not meet satiation point will sell her/his endowment
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of the additional good if q∗ > 0. Observe also that p∗ 6= 0 (if not we have
0 = q∗δi; this implies q∗ = 0 : a contradiction with (p∗, q∗) 6= 0).
One deduces from that, if x∗i is not a satiation point for every i ∈ I, then q∗ =
0, since
∑
i∈I di =
∑
i∈I δi > 0. In this case, p
∗ 6= 0, and ((x∗i )i∈I , (y∗j )j∈J , p∗)
is a Walras equilibrium.
Remark 5 (1) We can replace (H3) by (H3 bis): ”The total production set∑
j∈J Yj is closed, non-empty and convex” as in Florig and Yildiz (2002),
i.e., we do not require every Yj be convex. Indeed, we replace the sets Yj
by their closed convex hulls coYj. Let ((x
∗
i ), (y
∗
j ), p
∗) be an equilibrium with
dividends (d∗i ) of this new economy. This implies that every y
∗
j is in coYj. It
is obvious that for any j
p∗ · y∗j = max
y∈coYj
p∗ · y = sup
y∈Yj
p∗ · y.
By assumption,
∑
j Yj is closed and convex. We then have
∑
j Yj =
∑
j coYj
1. Hence there exist (ζ∗j) ∈ ΠjYj such that
∑
j ζ
∗
j =
∑
j y
∗
j . Since
∑
i x
∗
i =∑
i ei +
∑
j y
∗
j , and since p
∗ · ζ∗j ≤ p∗ · y∗j ,∀j, we must have p∗ · ζ∗j = p∗ · y∗j =
max p∗ ·Yj for every j. That means that ((x∗i ), (ζ∗j), p∗) is an equilibrium with
dividends for the initial economy.
(2) Let I1 = {i ∈ I : x∗i is not a satiation point} , and I2 = II1. From
Corollary 4, q∗d∗i = 0, for any i ∈ I1. Thus
∑
i∈I1 q
∗δi =
∑
i∈I2 q
∗.d∗i −∑
i∈I2 q
∗δi. This shows that the group of agents who meet satiation buy the
additional good from the group of agents who do not meet satiation.
4 No-arbitrage condition and existence of equi-
librium with dividends
If we assume that 0 ∈ Yj for every j, and if ((x∗i )i∈I , (y∗j )j∈J , p∗) is an equi-
librium with dividends, we will have
p∗.ei = p∗.ei +
∑
j
θij p
∗.0 ≤ p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θijp
∗.y∗j + q
∗δi.
1It comes from three facts. (i)We always have
∑
j coYj = co
∑
j Yj (see e.g. Florenzano,
Le Van and Gourdel, 2001, p. 16), (ii)
∑
j coYj ⊂
∑
j coYj and
∑
j Yj is closed and convex.
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Hence, for every i, we have ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ ui(ei). We therefore define the set of
individually rational feasible allocations A˜. More precisely:
A˜ =
{
((xi), (yj)) ∈
∏
i∈I
Xi ×
∏
j∈J
Yj :
∑
i∈I
xi =
∑
i∈I
ei +
∑
j∈J
yj,∀i, ui(xi) ≥ ui(ei)
}
.
We will replace (H4) by
(H4bis) The set A˜ is compact.
We have the following result:
Theorem 6 (i) Assume (H1), (H2), (H3), (H4bis), (H5) , for every j, 0 ∈ Yj
and
∀i,∀xi ∈ Xi,∃x′i ∈ Xi such that ui(x′i) > ui(xi).
Then there exists a Walras equilibrium.
(ii)Assume (H1), (H2), (H3), (H4bis), (H5) and for every j, 0 ∈ Yj. Then there
exists an equilibrium with dividends.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 2. One just replaces the
feasible set A by the set of individually rational feasible allocations A˜.
Let Pi = {xi ∈ Xi : ui(xi) ≥ ui(ei)} , and Wi be the recession cone of Pi.
Elements in Wi which are different from zero will be called useful vectors for
agent i (see Werner,1987). Let Zj denote the recession cone of Yj. Take some
γj ∈ Yj. Then γj + λzj ∈ Yj,∀λ ≥ 0, ∀zj ∈ Zj. We call useful production
vector for firm j any vector zj ∈ Zj \ {0} (the producer can produce an
infinitely large quantity γj + λzj, λ ≥ 0).
Let p ∈ Rl. We say that there exists an opportunity of arbitrage associ-
ated with p if either there exists i ∈ I, wi ∈ Wi \ {0} , such that p.wi ≤ 0,
or there exists j ∈ J , zj ∈ Zj, such that p.zj > 0. In other words, with
such a price p, either the consumer i will increase without bounds her/his
consumption or firm j will produce an infinite quantity.
A price vector p ∈ Rl is a no-arbitrage price for the economy if ∀i ∈ I,
wi ∈ Wi \ {0} =⇒ p.wi > 0, and ∀j ∈ J, zj ∈ Zj =⇒ p.zj ≤ 0.
We introduce the following No-Arbitrage Condition:
(NA) There exists a no-arbitrage price for the economy.
Remark 7 Our No-Arbitrage Condition coincides with the one for an ex-
change economy, i.e. when Yj = {0}, ∀j.
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Let us replace (H3) by
(H3ter) For each j ∈ J , the set Yj is nonempty closed convex and Y =∑
j∈J Yj is closed. Moreover, for every j, 0 ∈ Yj and Y ∩ −Y = {0} .
We have the following result
Theorem 8 (i) Assume (H1), (H2), (H3ter), (H5) and (NA). Then there ex-
ists an equilibrium with dividends.
(ii) Assume the following No-Halfline Condition :
(NHL) For i ∈ I, if wi ∈ Wi \ {0} , then for any x ∈ Pi, there exists λ > 0,
such that ui(x+ λwi) > ui(x).
Then:
((x∗i )i∈I , (y
∗
j )j∈J , p
∗) is an equilibrium with dividends ⇒ p∗is a no-arbitrage
price.
Proof. (i) It suffices to prove that A˜ is compact. Assume the contrary. Then
there is a sequence
(
(xni )i ,
(
ynj
)
j
)
n=1,..,∞
∈ A˜ such that σn =
∑
i ‖xni ‖ +∑
j
∥∥ynj ∥∥→ +∞ when n→∞. Since∑
i x
n
i
σn
=
∑
i ei
σn
+
∑
j y
n
j
σn
We can assume, without loss of generality, that((
xni
σn
)
i
,
(
ynj
σn
)
j
)
→
(
(wi)i , (zj)j
)
∈
((∏
i
Wi
)
×
(∏
j
Zj
))
 {0} .
Moreover, we have ∑
i
wi =
∑
j
zj.
Let p be a no-arbitrage price. If (wi)i 6= 0, we have a contradiction: 0 <
p.
∑
iwi = p.
∑
j zj ≤ 0. If (wi)i = 0, then
∑
j zj = 0. We have:
∑
k 6=j zk =
−zj. From (H3ter),
∑
k 6=j zk ∈ Y and zj ∈ Y. Hence zj ∈ Y ∩ −Y. This
implies zj = 0. We have shown that, in this case, we have (zj)j = 0 and a
contradiction with
(
(wi)i , (zj)j
)
6= 0.
We have proved that A˜ is compact.
(ii) Let ((x∗i )i∈I , (y
∗
j )j∈J , p
∗) be an equilibrium with dividends. It is obvious
that p∗.zj ≤ 0, for every zj ∈ Zj since y∗j + zj ∈ Yj and p∗.y∗j = max p∗.Yj.
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We have two cases.
Case 1. There exists some i ∈ I such that x∗i is not a satiation point. From
Corollary 4, p∗ 6= 0. If wi ∈ Wi {0} , then Condition (NHL) implies ui(x∗i +
λwi) > ui(x
∗
i ), for some λ > 0. Since ((x
∗
i )i∈I , (y
∗
j )j∈J , p
∗) is an equilibrium,
we have p∗.wi > 0.
Case 2. For any i ∈ I, x∗i is a satiation point. Condition (NHL) implies
that Wi = {0} , for every i. No-arbitrage Condition is satisfied in this case
with p∗.
Remark 9 The No Halfline Condition is satisfied with strictly concave func-
tions.
5 Appendix 1: Proof of Theorem 2
5.1 Gale-Nikaido-Debreu Lemma
We will make use of the following lemma the proof of which can be found in
Florenzano and Le Van (1986):
Lemma 10 (Gale-Nikaido-Debreu) Let P be a closed nonempty convex
cone in the linear space Rl. Let P 0 be the polar cone of P and S be the
unit sphere in Rl. Suppose that the multivalued mapping Z from S ∩ P to
Rl is upper semicontinuous and Z(p) is nonempty convex compact. Suppose
further that for every p ∈ S ∩ P, ∃z ∈ Z(p) such thar p.z ≤ 0. Then there
exists p ∈ S ∩ P satisfying
Z(p) ∩ P 0 6= ∅,
where P 0 = {q ∈ Rl : q.p ≤ 0, ∀p ∈ P}.
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5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We consider a sequence of truncated economies.
Let B(0, n) denote the ball centered at 0 with radius n. Let
Xni = Xi ∩B(0, n) , Y nj = Yj ∩B(0, n)
where i ∈ I, j ∈ J . Since ei ∈ Xi, we have ei ∈ Xni for all n is large enough.
For every (p, q) ∈ S ∩ (Rl × R+), where S is the unit sphere of Rl+1, define
the multivalued mapping
ξni , Q
n
i : Rl × R+ −→ Xi
by setting
ξni (p, q) =
{
xi ∈ Xni : p.xi ≤ p.ei +
∑
j∈J θij
∏n
j (p) + q
}
,
Qni (p, q) =
{
xi ∈ ξni (p, q) : if x′i ∈ Xni with ui(x′i) > ui(xi) then p.x′i ≥
p.ei +
∑
j∈J θij
∏n
j (p) + q
}
, where
∏n
j (p) = max p.Y
n
j .
Under the assumptions mentioned in Theorem 2 we have the following
lemma:
Lemma 11 For each i ∈ I the mapping Qni is upper semicontinuous having
nonempty compact convex values.
Proof. From the definition it is easy to see that ξni is upper semicontinuous
having nonempty convex compact values. From the definition of the mapping
Qni we have the following properties:
Let x ∈ ξni (p, q) and ui(x) = maxui(xi), with xi ∈ ξni (p, q) then x ∈ Qni (p, q).
Indeed, let x′i ∈ Xni and ui(x′i) > ui(x), then x′i /∈ ξni (p, q). Hence by the
definition of this set we have p.x′i ≥ p.ei+
∑
j∈J θij
∏n
j (p)+q, and therefore x ∈
Qni (p, q). This implies that Q
n
i (p, q) nonempty for every (p, q) ∈ S∩(Rl×R+).
For every xi, yi ∈ Qni (p, q) and λ ∈ [0, 1], since ξni (p, q) is convex we have
λxi+(1−λ)yi ∈ ξni (p, q). On the other hand, since ui is strictly quasiconcave,
ui(λxi + (1 − λ)yi) > min(ui(xi), ui(yi)). Hence, for each x′i ∈ Xni and
ui(x
′
i) > ui(λxi+(1−λ)yi), it follows that ui(x′i) > min(ui(xi), ui(yi)). Thus
p.x′i ≥ p.ei +
∑
j∈J θij
∏n
j (p) + q. Hence λxi + (1 − λ)yi ∈ Qni (p, q) which
means that Qni (p, q) is convex.
The mapping Qni is closed. Indeed, let
(pk, qk, xki ) ∈ graphQni
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and assume that (pk, qk) → (p, q), xki → xi. Since xki ∈ Qni (pk, qk) ⊂
ξni (p
k, qk) and ξni is closed, we have xi ∈ ξni (p, q). On the other hand, let
x′i ∈ Xin with ui(x′i) > ui(xi) , by the upper semicontinuity of ui we see that
ui(x
′
i) > ui(x
k
i) for all k large enough. Since x
k
i ∈ Qni (pk, qk), we have
pk.x′i ≥ pk.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij
∏n
j
(pk) + qk.
Letting k → +∞ we obtain
p.x′i ≥ p.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij
∏n
j
(p) + q.
This implies that xi ∈ Qni (p, q). Hence Qni is closed. But, since
Qni (p, q) ⊂ ξni (p, q) ⊂ Xni
for all (p, q) ∈ S ∩ (Rl × R+), n ≥ 1 and Xni is compact, we see that Qni is a
compact mapping. Hence Qni is upper semicontinuous.
a) Under assumptions (H1) − (H4) we now show that there exists quasi-
equilibrium. Let Φnj (p) denote the solution-set of
∏n
j (p), that means yj ∈
Φnj (p) if and only if p.yj = max p.Yj
n. Define the mapping zn by setting, for
each (p, q) ∈ S ∩ (Rl × R+),
zn(p, q) = (
∑
i∈I
Qni (p, q)−
∑
i∈I
ei −
∑
j∈J
φnj (p))× {−|I|}
where S stands for the unit sphere in Rl+1. By virtue of Lemma 11, from the
assumptions of the theorem it is easy to see that zn is upper semicontinuous
having nonempty convex compact values. Note that for any x in zn(p, q) we
can write
x = (
∑
i∈I
xni −
∑
i∈I
ei −
∑
j∈J
ynj )× (−|I|)
where xni ∈ Qni (p, q) and ynj ∈ Φjn(p). Since xni ∈ Qni (p, q), that implies
p.xni ≤ p.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij
∏n
j
(p) + q = p.ei +
∑
j∈J
θijp.y
n
j + q
or
p.
∑
i∈I
xni ≤ p.
∑
i∈I
ei +
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
θijp.y
n
j + |I|q = p.
∑
i∈I
ei + p.
∑
j∈J
ynj + |I|q.
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Thus
p.(
∑
i∈I
xni −
∑
i∈I
ei −
∑
j∈J
ynj )− |I|q ≤ 0.
Hence (p, q).x ≤ 0 for every (p, q) ∈ S ∩ Rl × R+, and x ∈ zn(p, q). Ap-
plying the Gale-Nikaido-Debreu Lemma , we can conclude that there exists
(pn, qn) ∈ S ∩ (Rl × R+) such that
zn(pn, qn) ∩ (Rl × R+)0 6= ∅.
Since (Rl × R+)0 = (ORl × R−), it follows that for every i ∈ I, j ∈ J there
exists xni ∈ Qni (pn, qn), ynj ∈ Φnj (pn) satisfying∑
i∈I
xni −
∑
i∈I
ei −
∑
j∈J
ynj = 0, (5)
pn.xni ≤ pn.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij
∏n
j
(pn) + qn
for every i ∈ I, and
pn.x′i ≥ pn.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij
∏n
j
(pn) + qn. (6)
for every x′i ∈ Xni which satisfies ui(x′i) > ui(xni ).
From (5) we have (xni , y
n
j ) ∈ A. Since A is compact, without loss of generality,
we may assume that
(xni , y
n
j ) −→ (x∗i , y∗j ).
Since (pn, qn) ∈ S ∩ (Rl × R+) and S ∩ (Rl × R+) is compact, we can also
assume (pn, qn) −→ (p∗, q∗). From (5) and (6) it implies∑
i∈I
x∗i −
∑
i∈I
ei −
∑
j∈J
y∗j = 0, (7)
p∗.x∗i ≤ p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij
∏
j
(p∗) + q∗ for every i ∈ I, (8)
where
∏
j(p
∗) = max{p∗.Yj}.
Let xi ∈ Xi satisfy ui(xi) > ui(x∗). Define
xλi = λxi + (1− λ)x∗i ,
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where λ ∈ (0, 1]. Since ui is strictly quasiconcave, it implies ui(xλi ) >
ui(x
∗
i ). Moreover, since ui is upper semicontinous and x
n
i → x∗i , for every n
large enough, we have ui(x
λ
i ) > ui(x
n
i ). Thus by (6) we obtain
pn.xλi ≥ pn.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij
∏n
j
(pn) + qn
or
pn.(λxi + (1− λ)x∗i ) ≥ pn.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij
∏n
j
(pn) + qn.
Let n→ +∞ we obtain
λp∗.xi + (1− λ)p∗.x∗i ≥ p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij
∏
j
(p∗) + q∗.
Let λ→ 0 we get
p∗.x∗i ≥ p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij
∏
j
(p∗) + q∗. (9)
Then from (8) and (9) follows
p∗.x∗i = p
∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij
∏
j
(p∗) + q∗ for every i ∈ I,
and hence
p∗.
∑
i∈I
x∗i = p
∗.
∑
i∈I
ei +
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
θij
∏
j
(p∗) + |I|q∗.
or
p∗.(
∑
i∈I
x∗i −
∑
i∈I
ei −
∑
j∈J
y∗j ) = |I|q∗
But, from
∑
i∈I x
∗
i −
∑
i∈I ei −
∑
j∈J y
∗
j = 0 follows |I|q∗ = 0. Hence q∗ = 0
and p∗ 6= 0. Thus ((x∗i )i∈I , (y∗j )j∈J , p∗) is a quasi-equilibrium.
b) Now we show that if, in addtion, (H5) is satisfied, then this quasi-equilibrium
is in fact an equilibrium. Take xi ∈ Xi such that ui(xi) > ui(x∗i ). By the
just proved preceeding part we have
p∗.xi ≥ p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θij sup p
∗.Yj = p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θijp
∗.y∗j .
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In contrary we suppose that
p∗.xi = p∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θijp
∗.y∗j . (10)
Then, since
ei ∈ int(Xi −
∑
j∈J
θijYj),
we have
inf p∗.(Xi −
∑
j∈J
θijYj) < p
∗.ei.
This means that there exists x′i ∈ Xi, y′j ∈ Yj such that
p∗.(x′i −
∑
j∈J
θijy
′
j) < p
∗.ei
which implies
p∗.x′i <
∑
j∈J
θijp
∗.y′j + p
∗.ei ≤
∑
j∈J
θijp
∗.y∗j + p
∗ei. (11)
Let xλi = λx
′
i + (1 − λ)xi with λ > 0. Since {xi : ui(xi) > ui(x∗i )}, by
assumption, is open, we have
ui(x
λ
i ) > ui(x
∗
i ). (12)
for every λ sufficiently small. On the other hand, from (10) and (11) we have
p∗.(λx′i + (1− λ)xi) = λp∗.x′i + (1− λ)p∗.xi
< λ(
∑
j∈J
θijp
∗.y∗j + p
∗.ei) + (1− λ)(
∑
j∈J
θijp
∗.y∗j + p
∗.ei)
or
p∗.xλi < p
∗.ei +
∑
j∈J
θijp
∗.y∗j . (13)
From (12) and (13) we arrive at a contradiction to the assumption that
((x∗i )i∈I , (y
∗
j )j∈J , p
∗) is a quasi-equilibrium. The theorem is proved.
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6 Appendix 2: An example of economies where
the no-arbitrage condition is satisfied
Consider a two-period economy with two consumers and one firm. There
exists one consumption good, one capital good, two assets. In the second
period, there are two states of nature. Firm produces in period 1. Consumer
i consumes ci0 in period 1, c
i
s in period 2 if state s occurs. She/he owns αik0
capital stock (k0 is the initial capital stock, αi is the share between the two
consumers of this capital stock). She/he buys in period 1, θi1, θ
i
2 assets which
yield in period 2, vi,1s θ
i
1 + v
i,2
s θ
i
2 consumption goods if state s occurs. The
preference of consumer i is represented by a concave, increasing function ui.
Consumer i solves the problem (P):
maxui(ci0, c
i
1, c
i
2)
under the constraints
p0c
i
0 + q.θ
i ≤ αirk0 + βipi∗
and
0 ≤ cis ≤ eis + vi,1s θi1 + vi,2s θi2
where p0 is the price of consumption good in period 1, q is the price of assets,
pi∗ is the profit of firm, βi is the share of profit, r is the price of the capital
good and eis is the initial endowment in state s.
Firm solves the problem (Q):
pi∗ = max
k
{p0F (k)− rk}
where F is a concave production function, increasing and F (0) = 0.
An equilibrium is a list (p∗0, q
∗, r∗, c∗i0 , c
∗i
1 , c
∗i
2 , k
∗) such that
(i) (c∗i0 , c
∗i
1 , c
∗i
2 ) solve problem (P) with p0 = p∗0, q = q∗, r = r∗,
(ii) k∗ solves (Q) with p0 = p∗0, r = r∗,
and (iii)
c∗10 + c
∗2
0 = F (k
∗)
c∗is = e
i
s + v
i,1
s θ
∗i
1 + v
i,2
s θ
∗i
2 , ∀s = 1, 2
2∑
i=1
θ∗i1 = 0,
2∑
i=1
θ∗i2 = 0
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and finally
k∗ = k0.
Since the functions ui are increasing, the equilibrium problem is equivalent
to the following.
(c∗i0 , θ
∗i
1 , θ
∗i
2 ) solve:
maxui(ci0, e
i
1 + v
i,1
1 θ
i
1 + v
i,2
1 θ
i
2, e
i
2 + v
i,1
2 θ
i
1 + v
i,2
2 θ
i
2)
under the constraints
p∗0c
i
0 + q
∗.θi ≤ αir∗k0 + βipi∗
where pi∗ = maxk p∗0F (k)− r∗k = p∗0F (k∗)− r∗k∗ and
c∗10 + c
∗2
0 = F (k
∗),
2∑
i=1
θ∗i1 = 0,
2∑
i=1
θ∗i2 = 0
k∗ = k0.
Let Ai = {(θ1, θ2) : eis + vi,1s θ1 + vi,2s θ2 ≥ 0, for s = 1, 2}.
The consumption set for consumer i is Xi = R+×R+×Ai (the second factor
corresponds to the capital good). Let O+Ai denote the recession cone of Ai.
Then the recession cone of Xi is Wi = R+ × R+ ×O+Ai.
The production set for firm is
Y = {(y,−k, θ1, θ2) ∈ R+ × R− × {0} × {0} : y ≤ F (k)}.
Its recession cone is Z = R− × R− × {0} × {0}.
Let Si = {(q1, q2) : q1w1 + q2w2 > 0, ∀(w1, w2) ∈ O+Ai \ {(0, 0)}}.
Assume S = S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅. Then the No-arbitrage Condition holds. Indeed,
let p = (1, 1, s) with s ∈ S. Then we have p ·w > 0 for all w ∈ Wi {0} and
p · z < 0,∀z ∈ Z \ {0}.
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